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I would like to give my thoughts in response to Professor
Garrison's work, and comment tangentially on some of the other
commentators' points as well. First, I'm not sure that Professor
Garrison's overall conclusion that equitable distribution is a fail-
ure is fair. It is fair to say that her study shows that the current
system of distribution of property and support of ex-spouses and
children isn't working very well. But such a conclusion does not
necessarily mean that equitable distribution is a failure, espe-
cially considering that her study, interestingly enough, shows
that equitable distribution is largely irrelevant to the issue of
how parties live after divorce. That, perhaps, is the most surpris-
ing outcome. For the vast majority of men, women and children,
the whole issue is essentially irrelevant because there is not
enough property to really make a difference. What she also
shows is that where there is enough property to make a differ-
ence, the results are not very consistent. I don't think Professor
Garrison has been able to show-because I don't think any
study could show-that in individual instances shifting away
from a title-based system did not allow for more flexibility and
therefore more fairness.
I suggest that there are many cases, maybe not statistically
significant but certainly significant to the participants in those
cases, where equitable distribution helped to achieve a better re-
sult than would a title-based system. And I don't think Profes-
sor Garrison would counsel going back to a title-based system to
cure the problems of equitable distribution. I doubt there are
many people around who would say we should go back to that
system, even though, according to the research, under that sys-
tem the results were not very different than the results after the
system. Her study points out that equitable distribution does
not solve basic fairness problems, and as a result of the enact-
ment of equitable distribution we made other changes in the di-
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vorce law, particularly with respect to permanent alimony or
maintenance, that not only didn't help the situation, but per-
haps in many instances made it worse. On that point though, I
might suggest that changes in societal attitudes about the capa-
bilities and role of women had as much to do with what hap-
pened in the courts with respect to alimony and maintenance as
the change in the law, and we might well have changed the law
with respect to alimony or maintenance even if we hadn't en-
acted equitable distribution.
So going back to the question of whether we should or
should not have passed the equitable distribution law or that
part of the law which dealt with abolishing title, I don't think
the report suggests that passing the law was a bad idea. Rather,
we should recognize that by adopting equitable distribution we
didn't solve many problems some people thought would be
solved. If Professor Garrison's research had been available in
1979, those disappointed with the equitable distribution law
would have known to begin with that it wouldn't have solved the
problems, because the money just wasn't there. Unfortunately,
we in the legislature didn't take the time to determine how few
people equitable distribution would affect. Now, looking at the
effect of the equitable distribution law, the question arises where
should we go from here, where should we go as a legislature?
First of all, let me say that some of us in the legislature,
even before Professor Garrison's study, have understood that
there are problems with the system that equitable distribution
has not been able to solve and that therefore still need to be
changed. First of all, certainly, many of us from the very begin-
ning believed that the distribution of property should be equal,
not equitable, or at least there should be a presumption of
equality. I know that was my position way back when and the
position of many others. Equitable was essentially the result of a
compromise with those members who opposed any change. It
was my view that we should have a more predictable standard:
that the standard should be a presumption of equal. Even today,
I'm not sure we shouldn't move further toward the California
model, which is based on community property.
Many of us from the very beginning believed, and I still be-
lieve, that we ought to have at least a presumption of equal. I
don't mind tinkering with the presumption in the ways that Pro-
fessor Garrison suggests, in terms of providing more than equal
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where that's appropriate, especially in low-income families or
low-asset families, and in dealing with the issue of occupancy
and control of the marital residence. Many of us also recognize
that we should further modify the law, although it is true that
since 1984, when Professor Garrison's study was done, there has
been a modification of the law reminding judges that they can
exercise their power to award permanent maintenance when
necessary. We should go further. In legislation that I've pro-
posed, we would have the judge look at the standard of living
established during the marriage, and we would create a pre-
sumption of permanent maintenance or alimony in the case of
the long-term marriage.
I also agree with Professor Garrison on the need for ade-
quate counsel for the parties. Professor Garrison indicated that
adequate counsel is one important predictor of a favorable out-
come to the lower-income or lower-asset spouse (in most cases,
the wife). Again, in legislation I've proposed, we would provide
for a clearer mandate on judges to award counsel fees during the
course of litigation and we would provide standards for the
award of counsel fees that would look at the amounts paid by
the "monied" spouse for counsel, when determining how much
should be ordered to be paid by that spouse for the non-monied
spouse's attorney. So, I think that her study suggests that the
direction I and others in the legislature who have joined me are
going is the proper one, if we are to correct some of the other
problems suggested by the study.
Last, as discussed by Professors Garrison and Kay, is the
question of whether a no-fault standard of divorce makes any
difference in determining the financial outcome of the breakup
of the marriage. Professor Garrison's studies, in which she points
out that the vast majority of states in the United States are now
no-fault states, do not indicate that the financial outcome results
in New York are significantly different than the results reached
in other states. So, the fact that we have a fault-based system in
New York has not had the impact of awarding the economically
weaker spouse higher amounts of property. There remains, how-
ever, a perception that fault-based systems help the weaker
spouse, and this has engendered resistance to my proposals that
it is time to eliminate fault as a necessary element in divorces
where there is no consent. You can, of course, have a divorce on
a no-fault basis in New York with consent. Professor Garrison's
1991]
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study, and similar studies in other states, indicate that the fault
requirement is not particularly protective for women, at least as
a general matter. So, in the end I think that the study contrib-
utes to our understanding of what happens to people as a result
of divorce. I think the study supports moving from a standard of
equitable to a standard of equal. I think the study supports fur-
ther modification of the standards judges should use when deter-
mining the award of maintenance or alimony. Maybe that can be
done through case law, maybe it doesn't require a statutory
change, but I would be happy to support such a statutory
change. I think the study recognizes the importance of providing
counsel to the parties. This issue is not limited to having the
monied spouse pay for all attorneys' fees, but also involves the
difficult problem of providing counsel when there is no money
on either side, which is very often the case. Here, we have unfor-
tunately gone backwards in the last few years by reducing legal
aid to people who need or want a divorce. I also think that the
study does not support those who are opposed to adding an ir-
reconcilable differences standard to New York's grounds for di-
vorce. Such are my thoughts.
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